Taylor, G. (1980). ‘Pride’ in Explaining Emotion. Berkeley: University of California.
Intro
Taylor’s analytic study of pride emphasises the importance of belief in emotions of self-assessment, with the implicit assumption that many emotions necessarily involve reference to the subject’s thoughts and beliefs.
His study of pride is part of larger project, studying the emotions of self-assessment:
- Pride;
- Shame;
- Humiliation;
- Guilt;
- Remorse.
According to Taylor, understanding such emotions inform us about human beings as "self-conscious agents capable of making value-judgements not only about the world but about their own role in the world" (Taylor 1980: 386).
Part I
Taylor provides an analysis of Hume’s (1739) account of pride: "everything related to us, which produces pleasure or pain, produces likewise pride or humility".
Hume’s account
According to Hume-Taylor, pride has two central aspects both relating to pleasure:
- Object-directed pleasure: from perceiving/contemplating an agreeable object; and
- Self-directed pleasure: from experiencing the agreeable object as related to self.
In pride, self appears as both the "cause" and the "object" of pride. Pride is a form self-directed pleasure, whereby the focus of pride is a self-related agreeable object.
"So pride on this account can be summed up as consisting of a self-directed pleasure based on a distinct pleasure derived from something that is also mine" (Taylor 1980: 386)
An Agent's (relevant) Beliefs are Necessary for Pride
Hume's conditions are not sufficient. He has provided an 'objective' account of pride, but at the expense of the subjectivity of persons. Taylor criticises Hume of neglecting the subjective aspect of pride, namely "he completely ignores the relevant beliefs of the agent himself" (Taylor 1980: 388; my emphasis).
Taylor's Analysis of Hume
Hume runs into difficulty whereby a subject may not feel pride but other emotions (e.g. joy) in their transition from (1) to (2). The task is to solve how pride is distinguished from other, similar emotions.
Taylor begins by checking out Hume’s Pride Principle: that their must be a "close" relation between the self and the agreeable object; and that the agreeable object be "comparatively rare, fairly constant, and discernable to others as well as to the agent himself" (ibid).
But Taylor observes that Hume's definition of "close" is, at a glance, relatively vague. Hume refines his definiton of "close" in reference to people at a feast: "We may feel joy upon being present at a feast, where our senses are regal'd with delicacies of every kind. But it is only the master of the feast, who, beside the same joy, has the additional passions of self-applause and vanity" (Hume 1739: 290). Guests are joyful, hosts are proud. Taylor, nevertheless, finds it wanting.
Hence, Taylor considers 'relevant beliefs' as necessary to an account of pride.
Reflective Notes
Sartre’s Pure Reflection
How does Sartre’s ‘pure reflection’ work with pride? What does the reflection say: "The house is beautiful because it’s mine", "My house is beautiful because I am proud" or "I am valuable because I am proud"?
Vanity-Pride Distinction
How can pride be distinguished from vanity? The latter appears to be related more to facticity than trancendences.
Bibliography
Hume, D. (1739). A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 2 , Part 1, section VI
Taylor, G. (1980). ‘Pride’ in Explaining Emotion. Berkeley: University of California.
Dyson, M. E. (2006). Pride: the Seven Deadly Sins. NY: Oxford.