Taylor, G. (1985). Pride, Shame, and Guilt. NY: Oxford University Press.
1. Emotions and Beliefs
Humiliation: a ‘propositional emotion’ whereby “reason-giving is appropriate” (8).
(Taylor criticises Davidson’s account of explanation for emotions as too neat and simple.)
“It is typical of humiliation that it spreads from the present occasion to other aspects of one’s life” (9).
(cf. Joyce, Dubliners)
Explanation of humiliation via grounds for a universal proposition (10).
Present experience makes him take certain view of himself which goes beyond the given context (10).
Self-contempt, contempt towards self-qualities and behaviour.
Emotions of Self-Assessment
The person experiencing [emotions of self-assessment] does not just see the situation in evaluative terms, he also assimilates what he values or disvalues into a structure of his achievements or failures, as so viewed by him. We therefore have here different dimensions of interconnected assessment: his evaluation of the situation will cause him to alter his views of himself to a lesser or greater degree, though perhaps only temporarily. But also conversely, it is at least very likely that he evaluates the situation as he does because his view of himself is what it is (15).
It follows from the nature of the relevant beliefs that a person who gives little thought to his own conduct and aims, or to how in different situations one should or should not react, will not be assailed by such emotions (15).
And it follows from the nature of these beliefs that if, having given thought to the situation, he thinks that all is as it should be, that he gets what he expects and himself contributes what is expected of him, he, too, will not be much involved in the drama of experiencing [emotions of self-assessment] (15).
The new situation, as seen by him, clashes with the world as he (possibly unthinkingly) expected to find it, and as a result there is a change in his beliefs concerning his relationship to this world, and thereby concerning himself. He now sees it as quite different from what he took it to be, and this difference is reflected in his own standing (16).
In some cases the experiencing of these emotions may indicate a degree of moral sensitivity which he who does not experience them on similar occasions may lack; in others it may betray an undue preoccupation with his own importance (16).
An investigation of this group of emotions [i.e. of self-assesment] will have a bearing on the assessment of people as moral agents (16).
2. Pride and Humility
Pride is by no means always vicious nor humility always virtuous (36).
It seems quite possible for [a subject] frequently to experience pride (in himself) and yet to remain quite humble. Again, he may possess the virtue of humility and yet not be prone to suffer frequently the unpleasant satisfaction, which for Hume constitutes the passion of humility (36).